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Abstract 
 
Theorizing how human rights function as a liberal governing technology has 
undoubtedly been an important contribution of ‘governmentality studies’. Such 
theorization, however, has largely eschewed concerted examination of the mobilization 
and impact of human rights in historically specific struggles. This has tended to divorce 
the theoretical concerns of critical rights scholarship from the specificity of political 
struggles, reifying rights and obscuring the agency of ‘the governed’ in struggles against 
socio-economic disposability. Calling for greater attention to human rights’ potential 
destabilisations of conduct, the article examines Foucault’s work into forms of resistance 
to ‘power that conducts’ -- ‘counter-conduct’ -- which is increasingly inspiring wide-
ranging analyses of resistances to conducting power. Bringing together the ‘theorizing 
practice’ of counter-conduct and the enduring campaigns for justice by survivors and 
activists of the 1984 Bhopal gas disaster, the article examines how human rights enable 
forms of self-formation that interrupt the subjectification of those constructed as 
disposable subjects. Illuminating their intervention in their ethical self-transfiguration 
mitigates the occlusion of the agency of the governed. Moreover, it argues, the thinking 
of counter-conduct recalibrates Foucault’s own methodological orientations away from 
an overwhelming focus on mechanisms of governmental power, towards the study of the 
counter-conductive practices of co-governing subjects. 
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2 
Introduction: Human Rights, Power and Resistance 
 
Critical scholarship on human rights finds itself in an unfortunate conundrum. Eager to 
eschew the overly optimistic and ideologically inflected assessments of human rights that 
one finds in contemporary world political and non-governmental practice, 1  such 
scholarship has tended to dismiss rights as ‘a priori normalizing’, concerned that their 
positive ‘social effects’ are little more than ‘a discursive imposition from above’.2 In 
International Relations (IR) literature well-rehearsed concerns revolve, for example, 
around the symbolic mobilization of rights by powerful state and non-state actors to 
shame and discipline those recalcitrant states and groups, which are seen to be violating 
individual or group rights. Moreover, scholars regret the legally comprehensible but 
politically problematic priority of justiciable civil and political rights over aspirational 
economic and social rights.3 More recently, scholars broadly working within the subfield 
of ‘governmentality studies’ have also examined the normalizing and governing effects of 
human (and also constitutional) rights.4 Such studies have primarily focused on how 
rights create new categories of, and engender, rights-holder subjectivities that enable the 
furtherance of (neo)liberal rationalities and mentalities of directing and governing socio-
economic and political life.5 As such, they have importantly shown how rights are a 
privileged liberal technology for directing and channelling our political ‘conduct’,6 which 
calls into being rights-bearing subjects and structures their political possibilities for 
resistance. At the same time, however, such theoretical concern has not been combined 
with empirical examination of the impacts of human rights on practices of dissent and 
                                                        
1 For a critique, see David Kennedy, The Dark Sides of Virtue: Reassessing International Humanitarianism 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005). 
2 Lois McNay, ‘Self as Enterprise: Dilemmas of Control and Resistance in Foucault’s The Birth of 
Biopolitics’, Theory, Culture & Society, Vol. 26, no. 6 (2009), p. 70; see also, Duncan Ivison, ‘The Disciplinary 
Moment: Foucault, Law and the Reinscription of Rights’, in Jeremy Moss (ed.) The Later Foucault: Politics and 
Philosophy (London: Sage, 1998), pp. 129–48; Paul Patton, ‘Foucault, Critique and Rights’, Critical Horizons 
Vol. 6, no. 1 (2005), pp. 267–87. 
3 Daniel J. Whelan and Jack Donnelly, ‘The West, Economic and Social Rights, and the Global Human 
Rights Regime: Setting the Record Straight’, Human Rights Quarterly, Vol. 29, no. 4 (2007), pp. 908–49. 
4 Wendy Brown, States of Injury: Power and Freedom in Late Modernity (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press, 1995); Barbara Cruikshank, The Will to Empower: Democratic Citizens and Other Subjects (Ithaca, NY: 
Cornell University Press, 1999). 
5 Louiza Odysseos, ‘Human Rights, Liberal Ontogenesis and Freedom: Producing a Subject for 
Neoliberalism?’, Millennium: Journal of International Studies, Vol. 38, no. 3 (2010), pp. 747–72; Bal Sokhi-
Bulley, ‘Governing (Through) Rights: Statistics as Technologies of Governmentality’, Social & Legal Studies, 
Vol. 20, no. 2 (2011), pp. 139–55. 
6 In the sense of ‘government’ given by Michel Foucault, ‘The Subject and Power’, in Hubert Dreyfus and 
Paul Rabinow (eds), Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics, 2nd Revised Ed. (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1983), pp. 208–26. 
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forms of mobilisation in historically specific struggles.7 As a result, the diverse theoretical 
concerns of critical rights scholarship appear divorced from the specificity of political 
struggles, resulting in potentially reifying rights ‘as an abstract category’.8  
 
Scholars reasoning through situated socio-economic and political struggles have recently 
highlighted the undeniable significance and complex effects of human rights’ legal 
frameworks and discourses for the politics of resistance. Their struggle-oriented research 
calls for a reversal of the striking neglect of struggles in recognition the multifarious and 
‘illimitable’9 ways human rights are invoked to contest political oppression and socio-
economic disposability 10  and to forge a situated and non-legalistic conception of 
justice.11  
 
This productive debate about human rights and struggle revisits internal critiques of 
earlier governmentality studies across the social sciences, which had attributed this 
negligible attention to the ‘agonism of politics’ to their ‘univocal…overly coherent and 
systematic’12 conception of the exercise of governmental power. Such a monolithic 
reading of Foucault’s notion of diffuse, adaptive and potentially reversible power that 
governs tended to reduce politics to ‘“mentalities of rule” to the virtual exclusion of 
understanding politics as social relations’.13 This had serious repercussions for the study 
of resistance within earlier governmentality scholarship: though heralding resistance as 
co-emergent with power, it paid little more than mere ‘lip service’ to ‘resistances’, falling 
short of a concerted incorporation of ‘struggles into its analysis’.14Combined with the 
predominantly ‘textual’15 methodologies of governmentality approaches to human rights, 
the near-exclusive focus on mechanisms of power largely led to a blindness to (the 
                                                        
7 Anna Selmeczi, ‘Who Is the Subject of Neoliberal Rights? Governmentality, Subjectification and the 
Letter of the Law’, Third World Quarterly, Vol. 36, no. 6 (2015), pp. 1076–91. 
8 McNay, op. cit, p. 70. 
9 Ben Golder, ‘Foucault’s Critical (Yet Ambivalent) Affirmation: Three Figures of Rights’, Social & Legal 
Studies, Vol. 20, no. 3 (2011), pp. 283–312. 
10 Louiza Odysseos, ‘The Question Concerning Human Rights and Human Rightlessness: Disposability 
and Struggle in the Bhopal Gas Disaster’, Third World Quarterly, Vol. 36, no. 6 (2015), pp. 1041–59. 
11 Lara Montesinos Coleman, ‘Struggles, over Rights: Humanism, Ethical Dispossession and Resistance’, 
Third World Quarterly, Vol. 36, no. 6 (2015), pp. 1060–75. 
12 Pat O’Malley, Lorna Weir, and Clifford Shearing, ‘Governmentality, Criticism, Politics’, Economy and 
Society, Vol. 26, no. 4 (1997), p. 501. 
13 Ibid. 
14 Justus Uitermark, ‘The Genesis and Evolution of Urban Policy: A Confrontation of Regulationist and 
Governmentality Approaches’, Political Geography, Vol. 24, no. 2 (2005), p. 147. 
15 Selmeczi, op. cit., note 7, p. 1078. 
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priority of) resistance, which persists in different forms to date. Such imbalance 
potentially has serious detrimental effects: it occludes the agency of the governed and 
obscures the resistive possibilities within power relations; equally worryingly, it 
unwittingly betrays the indubitable critical commitment of governmentality scholarship 
toward ‘the very dynamics of governmental power’.16 
 
This article accepts the important theoretical insights advanced by governmentality 
approaches to human rights. At the same time, it recognizes their failure historically to 
see beyond the governing effects of rights -- through diverse processes of legal, political 
and ethical subjectification of rights-bearers -- to the destabilisations of conduct, which 
struggles through rights can bring about.17 In direct response to this concern, the article 
calls for greater attention to the resistive potential of human rights in struggle, which 
often renders the governing of our conduct unstable and reversible. The article examines 
how rights enable ways of escaping, subverting and evading the ‘processes implemented 
for conducting others’18 by turning, first, to Foucault’s analysis of ‘counter-conduct’ in 
the Christian pastorate as a crucial resource in illuminating forms of resistance to ‘power 
that conducts’.19 Second, the article surveys recent appropriations of Foucault’s ‘counter-
conduct’ in cognate social science fields. Ranging from sociology of medicine to urban 
studies, such recent analyses contribute to our understanding of contemporary 
mobilizations of ‘counter-conduct’ and illuminate ‘certain forms of contestation … that 
go beyond open protest or direct confrontation’, which are frequently neglected by 
conventional accounts of resistance and social movements.20 Engaging with Foucault’s 
thinking of counter-conduct, and its recent appropriations, expands our understanding of 
subjects’ struggles, bringing to the fore the significance of ethical and political self-
formation in destabilising predominant modes of subjecticification 21 and the resulting 
                                                        
16 Ibid. 
17 Ibid.; See also, Coleman, op. cit. 
18 Michel Foucault, Security, Territory, Population: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1977-1978, trans. Graham 
Burchell (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), p. 201. 
19 Following Foucault, ibid., the article distinguishes resistance to power that conducts from resistance to 
forms of oppression associated with the sovereign state and the exploitative tendencies of the market, 
which we formed the traditional focus of human rights scholarship. Regarding the latter, see, for example, 
Jack Donnelly, ‘The Relative Universality of Human Rights’, Human Rights Quarterly, Vol. 29, no. 2 (2007), 
pp. 281–306. 
20 Marit Rosol, ‘On Resistance in the Post-Political City: Conduct and Counter-Conduct in Vancouver’, 
Space and Polity, Vol. 18, no. 1 (2014), p. 71. 
21 Arnold I. Davidson, ‘In Praise of Counter-Conduct’, History of the Human Sciences, Vol. 24, no. 4 (2011), 
pp. 25–41; Amy Allen, ‘Foucault and the Politics of Our Selves’, History of the Human Sciences, Vol. 24, no. 4 
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attempts of subjects to co-govern. Focusing on counter-conduct, then, helps us better 
grasp the creative agency of the governed that mobilizes human rights to engender 
inventive, self-transfiguring practices against ‘governmental power’. 
 
The article, in particular, examines how ethical discourses and claiming practices of 
human rights invoke new forms of self-formation that interrupt, if not entirely rescind, 
modes of subjectification emerging from colonial and contemporary processes of 
disposability. 22  How do such new types of self-formation through human rights 
intervene in the ethical self-transfiguration of those constructed as ‘non-pertinent’,23 
‘minority individuals’,24 disposable subjects of the global political economy? The article, 
then, argues that the counter-conductive potential of human rights hinges precisely in the 
incitement of subjects who claim their right and ability to ‘co-govern’, resisting and 
distancing themselves from the governing assumptions and objectives of existing socio-
economic discourses and practices.  
 
The thinking of counter-conduct, I argue, begins to assuage existing concerns that 
governmentality approaches to human rights unwittingly erase the agency of the 
governed. Reasoning through counter-conductive struggles, moreover, has potentially 
far-reaching repercussions for Foucault’s own methodological orientations to the study 
of disciplinary and governmental power,25 explored in the final section. The thinking of 
counter-conduct, I suggest, recalibrates the methodological orientations themselves away 
from an overwhelming focus on rationalities of rule and mechanisms of power, seen in 
later governmentality studies, towards an openness to the counter-conductive potential 
of self-forming and ‘not so governable’ subjects.  
 
                                                                                                                                                              
(2011), pp. 43–59; Odysseos, ‘Human Rights, Liberal Ontogenesis and Freedom’, op. cit.; Louisa Cadman, 
‘How (not) to Be Governed: Foucault, Critique, and the Political’, Environment and Planning D: Society and 
Space, Vol. 28, no. 3 (2010), pp. 539–56; Mitchell Dean, ‘“A Social Structure of Many Souls”: Moral 
Regulation, Government, and Self-Formation’, Canadian Journal of Sociology, Vol. 19, no. 2 (1994), p. 145. 
22 Odysseos, ‘The Question Concerning Human Rights’, op. cit., note 10; see also, Anna Selmeczi, ‘“… We 
Are Being Left to Burn Because We Do Not Count”: Biopolitics, Abandonment, and Resistance’, Global 
Society, Vol. 23, no. 4 (2009), pp. 519–38; Neferti X. M. Tadiar, ‘Life-Times of Disposability within Global 
Neoliberalism’, Social Text, Issue 115, Vol. 31, no. 2 (2013), pp. 19–48. 
23 Foucault, Security, Territory, Population, op. cit., note 18, p. 42. 
24 Michel Foucault, The Birth of Biopolitics: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1978-1979, trans. Graham Burchell 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), p. 259. 
25 Michel Foucault, ‘Two Lectures’, in Colin Gordon (ed.), Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other 
Writings, 1972-1977 (Hemel Hempstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1980), pp. 78–108. 
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Epistemologically committed to theorising through struggles, I discuss the potential of 
human rights for counter-conduct through the activism and campaigns for justice in 
Bhopal, India, following the December 1984 Bhopal gas leak disaster. Widely regarded as 
the world’s worst industrial accident, the leak led to the emergence of various ‘fronts’, 
associations and unions, as well as to evolving movements and campaigns, by survivors, 
activists and their international ‘next of kin’.26 Their enduring campaigns and struggles 
continue with renewed urgency in the third decade since the disaster and illuminate the 
reversibility of conduct and tenacity of counter-conductive, self-transfiguring agency.  
Counter-Conduct in Foucault’s Examination of the Christian Pastorate  
 
In Security, Territory, Population, Foucault locates the emergence of practices of counter-
conduct within an episodic history of the Christian pastorate: ‘counter-conducts’ denote 
dissent against a variety of pastoral ‘governing’ practices, all aimed to shape, regulate and 
refine religious and spiritual conduct. In other words, the term ‘counter-conduct’ refers 
to those efforts whose aim was to invoke new directions, priorities, or objectives, and to 
chart ways of escaping direction by the subjects of power themselves. Foucault’s 
extensive discussions of the limitations of the existing vocabulary that confronted his 
efforts ‘show how careful he was in wanting to find a concept that neglected neither the 
ethical nor the political dimensions and that made it possible to recognize their nexus’.27 
None of the usual terms employed in relation to resistance – ‘revolt’, ‘disobedience’, 
‘insubordination’, ‘dissidence’, ‘misconduct’ – were particularly appropriate, Foucault 
argued, being alternatingly ‘either too strong, too weak, too localized, too passive, or too 
substance-like’.28 
 
Settling on the ‘badly constructed’29 term ‘counter-conduct’, which at least maintained 
the inseparable link to conduct, Foucault presages the discussion of countering conduct 
by emphasising the multiple nuances of the verb ‘to govern’. ‘To govern’ held a broad 
range of meanings, from ‘imposing a regimen’, as a doctor does to a patient, to governing 
                                                        
26 A phrase used to capture ‘the fluctuating consortia of human rights and environmental activists’, 
Upendra Baxi, ‘Writing about Impunity and Environment: The “silver Jubilee” of the Bhopal Catastrophe’, 
Journal of Human Rights and the Environment, Vol. 1, no. 1 (2010), p. 29. 
27 Davidson, op. cit., p. 28. 
28 Ibid. 
29 Olga Demetriou, in this issue. 
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one’s spouse in the sense that a husband, Foucault explains, ‘support[s], provide[s] for 
and give[s] means of subsistence’.30  
The semantic field covered by the concept of government includes…the notions 
of a movement in space, of material subsistence, of medical and spiritual 
direction towards health and salvation, and finally it always refers to an 
intercourse, to processes of exchange between individuals.31  
 
Thus, in the context of the pastorate, to govern connoted a range of ‘pre-political’, 
pastoral meanings that indicate the improving and regulative dimension of governing.32 
Counter-conduct in its historical emergence within the Christian pastorate, therefore, 
aimed to ‘redistribute, reverse, nullify and partially or totally discredit pastoral power in 
the systems of salvation, obedience, and truth…’33 and Foucault examines the various 
manifestations of these, such as for instance asceticism and mysticism. It is important to 
grasp, however, that counter-conducts did not always take the form of rejection or 
refusal of conduct, as I discuss extensively below. They also manifested variably as a 
questioning, reworking and elaboration of pastoral power, which at times eroded but also 
at other times reinforced, redirected or improved the mechanisms, as well as the evolving 
objectives, of conducting power.34 
 
Anti-pastoral counter-conducts through doctrinal struggle and individual and group 
actions regarding spirituality sought to bring about ‘a whole new attitude, [religious] 
comportment, way of doing things and being and a whole new way of relating to God, 
obligations, morality, as well as civil life’.35 In the evolution of the pastorate and its 
institutionalisation there emerged, then, 
movements whose objective is a different form of conduct, that is to say: wanting 
to be conducted differently, by other leaders (conducteurs) and other shepherds, 
towards other objectives and forms of salvation, and through other procedures 
                                                        
30 Foucault, Security, Territory, Population, op. cit., note 18, p. 121. 
31 Paolo Savoia, ‘Foucault’s Critique of Political Reason: Individualization and Totalization’, Revista de 
Estudios Sociales, No. 43 (2012), p. 17. 
32 Foucault, Security, Territory, Population, op. cit., note 18, p.126.  
33 Ibid., p. 204. 
34 Ibid., p. 202. 
35 Ibid., p. 204. 
      
8 
and methods. They are movements that also seek, possibly at any rate, to escape 
direction by others and to define the way for each to conduct himself. 36 
There is a danger that such an overview casts conduct as originary and ontologically prior 
to counter-conduct. That would be misleading however: resistances, redirections and 
refusals of conduct – counter-conducts -- were not purely responding to, i.e. secondary 
or subsequent, to pastoral forms of guidance. Rather, pastoral conduct evolved, 
transformed and intensified in the midst of, and in response to, anxieties, concerns and 
resistances about its evolving operations and functions. Its evolution emerges in a co-
constitutive and circular fashion as both a response to, and resulting in, distinct counter-
conducts. This elucidates the ‘immediate and founding correlation between conduct and 
counter-conduct’.37 In other words, ‘the diffuse centres of power do not exist without 
the points of resistance that are in some way primary; and that power does not take life 
as its objective without revealing or giving rise to a life that resists power’,38 a term we 
might broadly understand as processes that ‘render immobile and untouchable’, that fix 
and stabilize ‘those things that are offered to us as real, as true, as good’.39 
Foucault ends his 1977-78 lecture course without explicitly returning to ‘counter-conduct 
in the modern system of governmentality’.40 The significance of the analysis of ‘counter-
conduct’ for scholarly concern with ‘technologies of domination of individuals over one 
another’ is nevertheless clear. 41 Accounting more fully for the wide range of relations of 
conduct, requires consideration of the multifarious ‘processes by which the individual 
acts upon himself’, engaging in inventive, questioning and/or disruptive self-formation. 42 
The study of conducting power and its processes would remain partial and incomplete if 
it highlighted only the potentially coercive and repressive means through which those 
who govern ‘force people to do what the governor wants’.43 Understanding processes of 
conducting requires more concrete engagement with how governed subjects transform, 
                                                        
36 Ibid., p. 194. 
37 Ibid., p. 196. 
38 Gilles Deleuze, Foucault (New York: Continuum, 2006), p. 94. 
39 Michel Foucault, ‘Power, Moral Values and the Intellectual, an Interview with Michael Bess’, History of the 
Present, Spring 1988, p. 1. 
40 Foucault, Security, Territory, Population, op. cit., note 18, p. 355. 
41 Michel Foucault, Religion and Culture, Jeremy Carrette (ed.), (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 
1999), p. 162. 
42 Ibid. 
43 Ibid. 
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redirect, evade and, possibly, also subvert pastoral governing; that is, how ‘the self is 
constructed and modified by oneself’.44  
 
Specifically, our accounts of human rights need to illuminate concretely and 
simultaneously how they both contribute to our ‘governing’ and also how they might 
question and counter such complex processes. The connection of counter-conduct to 
ethical self-formation calls into question prevalent variations of Kantian philosophy’s 
moral subjectivity, whose freedom is manifested ‘as autonomy and self-legislation’.45 
Counter-conducting, I argue, marks the emergence of a self-transfigured, critical and 
ethical existence: ethical in the sense and practice of reflective self- and other-regarding 
care,46 and critical because as a practice [askesis] it ‘reveal[s] and resists[s] the intertwining, 
intensification, and mutual reinforcement of relations of power, knowledge, and 
subjectivity’.47 Foucault’s thinking of counter-conduct, and counter-conduct through 
human rights, questions ‘anything as definitive, and untouchable, obvious, or immobile’ 
in an attempt to ‘bring things back to their original mobility, their openness to change’.48 
In this sense, counter-conduct speaks of a situated practice that enables subjects in the 
context of specific struggles to ‘escape oneself’49 in the sense of ‘allowing refusal, and 
curiosity, and innovation’.50 I return to the concern with self-formation below in the 
discussion of recent analyses that mobilize notions of counter-conduct. 
Contemporary Manifestations of Counter-Conduct  
 
How have recent discussions of counter-conduct in social scientific fields illuminated 
contemporary empirical manifestations of resisting conducting power? The engagement 
with on-going practices of counter-conduct in diverse social domains helps locate such 
practices as responding to, and themselves further shaping, the conducting of conduct 
                                                        
44 Ibid., emphasis added. 
45 Edward F. McGushin, Foucault’s Askesis: An Introduction to the Philosophical Life, Annotated Edition 
(Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 2006), p. 284, see also, pp. 242-53. 
46 Louiza Odysseos, ‘On the Way to Global Ethics? Cosmopolitanism, “Ethical” Selfhood and Otherness’, 
European Journal of Political Theory, Vol. 2, no. 2 (2003), pp. 183–207; As Foucault claims, ‘The only ethics 
you can have, with regard to the exercise of power, is the freedom of others’, in Foucault, ‘Power, Moral 
Values and the Intellectual’, op. cit., note 39, p. 13. 
47 McGushin, op. cit., p. 287, brackets added. 
48 Foucault, ‘Power, Moral Values and the Intellectual’, op. cit., note 39, pp. 1–2. 
49 Michel Foucault, The Use of Pleasure: The History of Sexuality, Vol. 2 (London: Vintage, 1990), p. 50. 
50 Foucault, ‘Power, Moral Values and the Intellectual’, op. cit., note 39, p. 13. 
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within the neoliberal milieu.51 Research into contemporary forms of counter-conduct 
highlights critical and resistive responses to modes of subjectification that aim at the 
incitement of self-responsible subjects. As has been extensively noted, processes of ‘self-
responsibilization’ render ‘autonomy’ a technique of governing, which  reverses the 
conception of ‘autonomy’ found in liberal thought as the very boundary of social and 
state control.  52   This has at least two notable repercussions: first, that frequently 
responsibility is internalised, such that counter-conduct is not so much a refusal but a 
critically informed demand to co-govern, to redirect or change processes and objectives 
of governing. Second, and related, that the subtle and non-declaratory53 forms that 
counter-conduct takes signify the kind of resistance that emerges in a post-political age, 
in which a ‘post-political consensus denies the “political”, neutralises dissent and de-
politicises deeply antagonistic social relations’.54 This second, important concern requires 
discussion of whether counter-conduct itself contributes to such depoliticisations 
through its ‘unorganised and nonstrategic’ expressions.55  
 
Sel f - responsibi l i ty  and co-governing 
 
Contemporary analyses of neoliberal 56  modes of subjectification note a politically 
significant transformation of ‘individual autonomy’ into one of ‘[the] central 
technologies’ of government and self-government; this subverts the classical liberal 
account of autonomy as ‘an obstacle or limit to social control … so that it is compatible 
with governance rather than … its absolute limit or the point at which governance 
falters’. 57  Ideas of active self-regulation and self-government facilitate conducting 
                                                        
51 Which Foucault appears not to address explicitly in The Birth of Biopolitics, op. cit., note 24; see Davidson, 
op. cit.. 
52 McNay, op. cit., p. 62. 
53 For a discussion of declaring rights in the history of human rights, see Lynn Hunt, Inventing Human Rights: 
A History (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2008), pp. 113–145. 
54 Rosol, op. cit., p. 72. 
55 Ibid. 
56 I take ‘neoliberalism as a background epistemic or ideological context that sets the parameters within 
which specific practices are meaningful (they make sense) and functional (they work 
correctly)…neoliberalism is one of the primary epistemological frameworks that shape structures of 
subjectivity, relations of production, gender and race politics, even artistic practices and aesthetics’, see 
Robin James, ‘Neoliberal Noise: Attali, Foucault & the Biopolitics of Uncool’, Culture, Theory and Critique, 
Vol. 55, no. 2 (2014), p. 139. 
57 McNay, op. cit, p. 63. 
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through ‘the very freedom of individuals’ and constitute a significant inflection of the 
notion of freedom itself.58 This attitude is not necessarily contrary to the improving 
impulse of pastoral governmentality. One might more accurately argue that caring and 
improving shifts towards self-responsibility, such that the work of conduct becomes to 
call into being self-responsible and self-caring subjects. Evidence of this tendency towards 
‘responsibilization’ is found in a very broad range of social domains, ‘from criminal 
justice to workplace safety, and from social insurance systems to the labor market’; its 
effect is first and foremost manifested ‘as an obligation to accept personal responsibility 
for the outcomes related to certain actions’.59 As scholars concerned with contemporary 
forms of abandonment and disposability have also shown, ‘non-pertinent’ subjects are 
often encouraged ‘to assume responsibility for states of affairs for which they are not 
responsible’, such as failures of the market, entrenched structural inequalities and the 
often disastrous social effects of neoliberalisation of international trading regimes and 
national economic structures.60  
Given the special role of self-responsibility in the production of governable subjects,61 it 
is not surprising that contemporary manifestations of counter-conduct also revolve 
around the subversion, redirection and potential evasion of processes of 
responsibilization. For example, researchers of ‘somatic’ and health governing processes 
have noted how individual subjects cultivate practices of ‘irresponsibilisation’, that is, 
behaving ‘irresponsibly’ in their social interactions, engaging in risky ‘health’ behaviour 
and/or pursuing unhealthy and socially undesirable lifestyles, as defined by historically 
contingent governmental objectives. 62 Such behaviour shows the circularity of conduct 
and counter-conduct: processes of self-responsibilization engender not only responsibly 
acting subjects as intended but, at the same time, a range of inventive ‘irresponsible’ 
practices. The emergence of the latter calls on conducting technologies, in turn, to evolve 
to counter and manage them.63  
                                                        
58 Thomas Biebricher, ‘(Ir-)Responsibilization, Genetics and Neuroscience’, European Journal of Social Theory, 
Vol. 14, no. 4 (2011), p. 471; for a discussion of the meaning of freedom in such processes, see also, 
Odysseos, ‘Human Rights, Liberal Ontogenesis and Freedom’, op. cit., p. 753; Ben Golder, ‘Foucault, Rights 
and Freedom’, International Journal for the Semiotics of Law, Vol. 26, no. 1 (2013), pp. 5–21.  
59 Biebricher, op. cit., p. 470. 
60 McNay, op. cit., p. 65; see, importantly, Selmeczi, ‘“… We Are Being Left to Burn"’, op. cit., note 22; João 
Biehl, Vita: Life in a Zone of Social Abandonment (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 2012).  
61 Mitchell Dean, Governmentality: Power and Rule in Modern Society (London: Sage, 2010). 
62 For example, not altering behaviour based on genetic self-knowledge, Biebricher, op. cit., p. 484. 
63 See Foucault on invigilation, ‘The Subject and Power’, op. cit., note 6. 
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The view of self-responsible subjects as inventive and creatively resistive brings our 
attention to the versatility and malleability of subjective formation, refuting the reduction 
of subjects by scholarly analyses to ‘passive objects of ever more refined and efficient 
practices that aimed at an optimum level of docility and productivity’.64 I suggest that 
existing discussions of ‘irresponsibilization’ processes are significant but ought to be 
more heuristically viewed: rather than read as highlighting the re-emergence of the 
‘dangerous and incorrigible individual’,65 such practices exceed the thwarting or evasion 
of conduct. Behaving irresponsibly may well signify a critical attitude to the imperative of 
responsibility or, even, its failure, giving expression to a somatic and ethical self-relation 
that points to a ‘different form of conducting oneself’: ‘irresponsibly’ avoiding conduct 
may illuminate attempts to redirect it. 66  
 
A second notable manifestation of counter-conduct involves questioning of the 
objectives, directions and mechanisms of conduct for the purpose of improving them. 
Here, too, counter-conduct emerges in relation to responsibility. Studies of communities 
interacting with urban policy and regeneration initiatives, for example, have analyzed the 
solution-seeking origin and purpose of many counter-conducts. In cases of housing 
initiatives in South Africa,67 responses to urban re-designation in the United States,68 and 
management of urban shrinkage in the former German Democratic Republic,69 subjects 
resist by critiquing plans and approaches, formulating new options, influencing and 
redrafting objectives, or demanding the implementation of existing principles and 
policies that align with their desires and concerns, frequently holding governance to the 
‘letter of the law’.70  In such manifestations, subjects embody self-responsibility by 
employing it towards (what they consider to be) the betterment of policy, governing 
goals and mechanisms. Rather than refusing conduct, in a sense, they seek to ‘co-govern’, 
                                                        
64 Biebricher, op. cit., p. 473. 
65 Ibid., 480. 
66 Ibid., 474; See also, Carlos Novas and Nikolas Rose, ‘Genetic Risk and the Birth of the Somatic 
Individual’, Economy and Society, Vol. 29, no. 4 (2000), pp. 485–513. 
67 Ruth T. Massey, ‘Exploring Counter-Conduct in Upgraded Informal Settlements: The Case of Women 
Residents in Makhaza and New Rest (Cape Town), South Africa’, Habitat International, Vol. 44 (2014), pp. 
290–96. 
68 Rosol, op. cit. 
69 Nina Gribat, Governing the Future of a Shrinking City: Hoyerswerda, East Germany (PhD Thesis, Sheffield 
Hallam University, 2010), http://shura.shu.ac.uk/7027/. 
70 Anna Selmeczi, ‘Who Is the Subject of Neoliberal Rights?’, op. cit., note 7. 
      
13 
wresting from power their incitement as self-responsible subjects,71 and turning this self-
responsible ethos towards the ‘art of government’ itself. These counter-conducts are best 
grasped as ‘alternative attempts at governing’, 72 often inspired by habitual attachments 
or ideological leanings to previously privileged ways of thinking about politics and 
society, offering critical, historically-informed, reflection on present modes of being 
governed.  
 
Hence, counter-conduct as a critical demand for co-governing may eschew the form of 
an explicit and intentional ‘rejection of governing objectives [in an] open protest or direct 
confrontation’.73 Moreover, it might not necessarily involve ‘suggesting radically different 
approaches…’ in terms of policy content, programme direction or sweeping political 
demands.74 Rather, counter-conduct as co-governing may be ‘adopted to manipulate and 
benefit from what is available’ in order to ‘ensure the survival of social networks and 
other livelihood strategies’,75 reworking self-responsibility in its own ways. As Nina 
Gribat makes clear, often what is coined ‘counter-conduct’ is ‘constituted by the 
dominant governmental rationalities and not by the subjects who act in these ways’ who, 
far from rejecting conduct, are in fact advancing its critique, putting forward ‘diverging 
ideas and partaking in shaping and improving current practices.’76 The ethical stance 
underlying such counter-conducts involves subjects ‘defin[ing] for themselves what is 
good for them’.77  
 
Resis tance for  a ‘post -pol i t i ca l  age ’? 
 
The intervention of critically self-responsible subjects in the diverting and/or co-
governing of their own conduct frequently adopts and adapts the very same tools and 
policy instruments of conducting power. This has led some to question whether such 
‘non-confrontational and individual, unorganised and nonstrategic’ practices, signify the 
emergence of, and further contribute to, a ‘post-political’ era characterized by consensual 
                                                        
71 Massey, op. cit., p. 295; see also, Rosol, op. cit. 
72 Gribat, op. cit., p. 216. 
73 Rosol, op. cit., p. 72; brackets added. 
74 Gribat, op. cit., p. 216. 
75 Massey, op. cit., p. 295. 
76 Gribat, op. cit., p. 248. 
77 Foucault, ‘Power, Moral Values and the Intellectual’, op. cit., note 39, p. 12, brackets added. 
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politics.78 In the context of this article the question is whether the mobilization of rights 
in counter-conduct signals lack of contestation and growing acquiescence to a ‘post-
political’ consensus. 79  This view would cohere with the assessment of rights as 
normalizing, which tends to discount the mobilization of rights both for ‘confronting 
governments’80 and also, importantly, for imagining new futures and transforming one’s 
self.  
 
The question that co-governing indicates a diminishing attitude towards, and aptitude 
for, resistance articulates a serious concern. I argue, however, that privileging this anxiety 
remains part and parcel of the tendency to over-determine the effects of conducting 
power, which unwittingly occludes the agency of subjects and effaces the indeterminacy 
of rights in struggles.81 Moreover, such a view is in danger of stabilizing which practices 
we may regard as resistive, historically reducing them to those which are explicitly 
organized, political and strategic: in one word, visible. How do we contest the terms of 
this concern? In my view, this entails recognizing as political both refusals and resistances 
that take the form of rejection, or which speak in the registers of political expression, but 
also more subtle forms of questioning how current regimes of conduct render us ‘thus’, 
attempting to stabilize, for good or ill, our self-formation.  
 
Bringing into view ‘the ethical relationship of the self to itself’, which conducting aims to 
author and authorise, is one such form of resisting. For Louisa Cadman this is closely 
associated with the recovery of ‘the critical attitude found in pastoral counter-conducts’, 
which fuels ‘the experience of desubjugation’.82 Foucault defined the critical attitude ‘as 
the movement by which the subject gives [it]self the right to question’.83 For Cadman, 
rights are an important political practice whose ‘active and performative role … is 
achieved through another understanding: “the right to question” governmental regimes 
of truth’.84 The ‘right to question’ helps us view counter-conducts as practices of the 
                                                        
78 Rosol, op. cit., p. 72. 
79 As an example, see Jacques Rancière, ‘Who Is the Subject of the Rights of Man?’, South Atlantic Quarterly, 
Vol. 103, nos. 2–3 (2004), p. 297. 
80 Michel Foucault, ‘Confronting Governments: Human Rights’, in Power: Essential Works of Foucault, 1954-
1984, trans. James D. Faubion, Vol. 3 (New York: The New Press, 2001), pp. 474–75. 
81 Golder, op. cit., note 9; Coleman, op. cit. 
82 Cadman, op. cit., p. 553. 
83  Michel Foucault, The Politics of Truth, trans. Sylvère Lotringer and Lysa Hochroth (Los Angeles, CA: 
Semiotext(e), 2007), p. 32. 
84 Cadman, op. cit., p. 550; Foucault, The Politics of Truth, op. cit., p. 32. 
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‘freedom to think (and act) otherwise -- by bringing forth and questioning the regime of 
truth through which [individuals] are engaged as objects and subjects of government’.85  
 
‘The freedom to think (and act) otherwise’ illuminates how human rights enable diverse 
and context-specific practices of ethical self-formation; contra Cadman, however, who 
regards as counter-conducts as distinct from those ‘self-transformations required to suit 
the current governmental regime of truth’,86  I argue that self-formation cannot be 
restricted to rejecting or oppositional practices. In order to grasp contemporary counter-
conduct we must accept that it involves practices of the self working to challenge, 
redirect or modify techniques of power that govern our conduct, without the 
requirement of intentional rejection or explicitly political expression. Indeed, one might 
say that modes of self-formation that suit ‘the current governmental regime of truth’,87 
and practices of counter-conductive self-formation are two distinct moments of 
conducting processes. 
 
To put this in rather polemical terms, if a governmentality approach ‘refuses the 
reduction of political power to the actions of the state’,88  then a counter-conduct 
approach contests the reduction of resistance to discernible actions that resist oppression 
in expressly political registers and in visible and organized forms. Hence, 
irresponsibilisation and co-governing are not post-political or apolitical signs of the 
times, but an integral aspect of ethico-political engagement with governing: 
‘contestations, resistances and social antagonisms shape rule through systematic 
provision of alternatives’.89 As Foucault emphasized, ‘the most intense point of lives, the 
one where their energy is concentrated, is precisely where they clash with power, struggle 
with it, endeavour to utilize its forces or to escape its traps’.90 Attempts to co-govern, 
                                                        
85 Cadman, op. cit., p. 550; citing Michel Foucault, ‘Truth, Power, Self: An Interview with Michael Foucault, 
October 25, 1982’, in Luther H. Martin, Huck Gutman, and Patrick H. Hutton (eds), Technologies of the Self: 
A Seminar with Michael Foucault, (Amherst, Mass.: University of Massachusetts Press, 1988), p. 330. 
86 Cadman, op. cit., p. 553. 
87 Ibid. 
88 Peter Miller and Nikolas Rose, ‘Governing Economic Life’, Economy and Society, Vol. 19, no. 1 (1990), p. 
3. 
89 O’Malley, Weir, and Shearing, op. cit., p. 510. 
90 Michel Foucault, ‘The Life of Infamous Men’, in Paul Patton and Meaghan Morris (eds), Michel Foucault: 
Power, Truth, Strategy, trans. Paul Foss and Meaghan Morris, Working Papers Collection, Vol. 2 (Sydney: 
Feral Publications, 1979), p. 80; cited in Deleuze, op. cit., p. 78. 
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that is, to reflexively participate in, redirect and modify our own conduct, are inextricably 
tied to ‘etho-poetic’91 practices of self-formation.  
 
In the next section I ground the above observations in the struggles against disposability 
in Bhopal, the site of the world’s most catastrophic industrial accident, which has 
engendered a thirty-one year long search for legal accountability, economic survival and 
restorative social justice. I examine the evolving practices of Bhopal activists and 
survivors in order to continue Foucault’s ‘theorizing practice’ of counter-conduct. 92 
Reflecting on the Bhopal survivors’ self-transfiguring practices and invocations of rights 
shows their agency to far exceed their being conducted as disposable subjects of global 
capitalism. Reasoning through the diverse counter-conductive struggles of Bhopali 
survivors, I argue, inflects Foucault’s own methodological orientations to the study of 
power and arrests their potentially overwhelming focus on rationalities of rule and 
mechanisms of power, which tends to over-determine governed subjects as hermetically 
enclosed within power relations. Importantly, such a move highlights that, and how, the 
thinking of counter-conduct compels us to reconsider the complexity, indeterminacy and 
irreducibility of human rights as a governing technology.93 
 
 
Human rights, Self-formation and Co-governing: human rights and counter-
conduct against disposability in Bhopal 
 
In this section I locate the counter-conductive potential of human rights within the on-
going campaigns for justice following the 1984 toxic gas leak from Union Carbide 
Corporation’s pesticide-manufacturing subsidiary in the city of Bhopal, Madhya Pradesh, 
India.94 In the night of 2-3 December an estimated forty tonnes of extremely toxic 
                                                        
91 McGushin, op. cit., p. 287. 
92 Foucault, ‘Power, Moral Values and the Intellectual’, op. cit., note 39, p. 11. 
93 I thank Anna Selmeczi and Lara Montesinos Coleman for their productive critique and discussions on 
this point. 
94 Union Carbide Corporation (UCC) was the majority owner of the subsidiary Union Carbide India 
Limited (UCIL), which operated the plant, whilst the central role of UCC in design and evolving ‘safety’ 
procedures has been documented by lawyers, engineers and academics, see for example, Tara Jones, 
Corporate Killing: Bhopals Will Happen (London: Free Association Books, 2002); Nichol Bryan, Bhopal: 
Chemical Plant Accident, (Environmental Disasters) (New York: Gareth Stevens Publishing, 2003); Rosaline 
Dhara and V. Ramana Dhara, ‘Bhopal: A Case Study of International Disaster’, International Journal of 
Occupational and Environmental Health, Vol. 1, no. 1 (1995), pp. 58–69; Paul Shrivastava, Bhopal: Anatomy of a 
Crisis, Illustrated Edition (New York: HarperBusiness, 1987); Paul Shrivastava, Managing Industrial Crises: 
Lessons of Bhopal (New Delhi: Vision Books, 1987). Following the global notoriety of the gas disaster and its 
failure to accept responsibility, UCC became a wholly owned subsidiary of Dow Chemical in 1999. Dow 
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methyl isocyanate (MIC) and other yet unspecified gases leaked into the atmosphere in 
an explosion in the MIC processing unit of the chemical plant. Conservative estimates 
suggest that 3,000 residents of the neighbouring colonies [bastis] died within days of the 
leak and 20,000 more have died of various effects of gas-exposure to date.95 Moreover, 
half a million people, including survivors of the leak itself, as well as those born in the 
thirty one years since, continue to suffer from the health impacts of both direct gas 
exposure and what affiliated organisations are calling ‘the second poisoning’96 -- the soil 
and ground-water contamination of ever larger areas surrounding the non-remediated, 
and abandoned plant site.97 The ‘unending Bhopal gas disaster’98 is now widely regarded 
as the world’s most serious industrial catastrophe and, amongst analysts of its legal 
aftermath in India and internationally, increasingly considered a gross violation of human 
rights. 99  The continuing activist campaigns for legal and political accountability and fair 
reparations have mobilized a variety of discursive understandings to wage their fight, 
which has comprised of anti-systemic critiques of development and global capitalism, 
labour mobilization and unionization, as well as alternative modes of self-care in the 
search for work and healthcare suitable to their little understood and under-researched 
needs.100  
 
                                                                                                                                                              
Chemical has disavowed any liabilities and responsibility for the disaster and its worsening ecological and 
human consequences.  
95 Amnesty International contests these low figures and places the immediate death toll at 10,000, see 
Clouds of Injustice: Bhopal Disaster 20 Years on (London: Amnesty International UK, 2004); The International 
Campaign for Justice in Bhopal, following research amongst the municipal workers who collected the 
bodies, estimates that 8,000-15,000 died within days of the gas leak, see ‘The Death Toll’, 2015, 
http://www.bhopal.net/what-happened/that-night-december-3-1984/the-death-toll/ (accessed 22 June 
2015). 
96 The Bhopal Medical Appeal, ‘Bhopal’s Second Poisoning’, http://bhopal.org/second-poisoning/bhopal-
second-poisoning/, (accessed 9 July 2015). 
97 Greenpeace International, The Bhopal Legacy: Toxic Contaminants at the Former Union Carbide Factory Site 
Bhopal, India, 15 Years after the Bhopal Accident (London: Greenpeace International, 1999), 
http://www.greenpeace.org/international/en/publications/reports/the-bhopal-legacy-toxic-cont/ 
(accessed 13 January 2015). 
98 Bridget Hanna, ‘Bhopal: Unending Disaster, Enduring Resistance’, in Michel Feher (ed.), Nongovernmental 
Politics (Cambridge, Mass.: Zone Books, 2007), pp. 488–523. 
 
100 Suroopa Mukherjee, Surviving Bhopal: Dancing Bodies, Written Texts, and Oral Testimonials of Women in the 
Wake of an Industrial Disaster (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010); Eurig Scandrett and Suroopa 
Mukherjee, ‘Globalisation and Abstraction in the Bhopal Survivors’ Movement’, Interface: A Journal for and 
about Social Movements, Vol. 3, no. 1 (2011), pp. 195–209; Stephen Zavestoski, ‘The Struggle for Justice in 
Bhopal: A New/Old Breed of Transnational Social Movement’, Global Social Policy, Vol. 9, no. 3 (2009), pp. 
383–407; Satinath Sarangi, ‘The Movement in Bhopal and Its Lessons’, Social Justice, Issue 66, Vol. 23, no. 4 
(1996), pp. 100–108. 
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Resort to human rights’ analysis of the disaster and its consequences came quite late and 
were initially advocated by NGOs and elite members of India’s legal profession.101 
Human rights discourses found resonance with local survivors and activists in the midst 
of undeniable failures of tort litigation pursued in the United States’ courts.102 Rights 
offered a way to attribute responsibility to Union of India for its complicity in the 
making of the initial disaster and its lax pursuit of Union Carbide since the Indian 
Supreme Court 1989 settlement, which has allowed UCC to continue to escape its 
responsibilities in Bhopal.103 Indeed, the case of Bhopal has allowed advocates to lobby 
for improving direct mechanisms of attribution for multinational corporations.104  
 
Here I am not seeking to replicate their analyses; rather, I mobilise the above insights 
regarding counter-conduct to explore the ways in which human rights contribute to the 
emergence of subtle practices of self-formation that are nevertheless hugely significant 
for survivors’ ethical self-regard and on-going political struggle. Discussing human rights 
and/as counter-conduct in Bhopal illuminates how such practices enable self-formation 
against disposability, without denying the role of rights in materially constituting rights 
holding subjects at the same time. Avoiding either/or assertions -- either human rights 
conduct our conduct or they make it possible for us to resist incitements of ourselves as 
disposable -- elucidates that they do both and at the same time. 
 
The self-transfigurative potential of human rights is clearly evident in the ways in which 
people in struggle call upon their truth discourses and legal instruments to resist the 
assignment of disposability. 105  Human rights offer Bhopal survivors ‘authoritative’ and 
                                                        
101 Amnesty International, op. cit.; Verma, op. cit.. 
102 Marc Galanter, ‘Law’s Elusive Promise: Learning from Bhopal’, in Michael Likosky (ed.), Transnational 
Legal Processes: Globalisation and Power Disparities (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), pp. 172–85; 
Marc Galanter, ‘Legal Torpor:  Why So Little Has Happened in India after the Bhopal Tragedy’, Texas 
International Law Journal, Vol. 20 (1985), pp. 273–94. 
103 Dow Chemical has to date ignored a number of summons to present its subsidiary UCC to the District 
Court in Bhopal, most recently on 19 December 2015. See Amnesty International, ‘Dow Chemical Must 
Comply with New Indian Court Summons on Bhopal Disaster’, Amnesty International, 4 August 2014, 
http://www.amnesty.org/en/news/dow-chemical-must-comply-new-indian-court-summons-bhopal-
disaster-2014-08-04 (Accessed 20 October 2014);  
Dow Must Attend Criminal Case Hearing In Bhopal’, The Bhopal Medical Appeal, 18 December 2015,  
http://bhopal.org/dow-must-attend-criminal-court-hearing-in-bhopal/ (Accessed 20 December 2015). 
104 Amnesty International, op. cit., note 95; see also, Amnesty International, Injustice Incorporated: Corporate 
Abuses and the Human Right to Remedy (London: Amnesty International, 2014). 
105 For a longer theoretical discussion of the various facets of disposability, see the discussion in Odysseos, 
‘The Question Concerning Human Rights’, op. cit., note 10, pp. 1043–46. 
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internationally coherent accounts106  of themselves as rights-holders of equal moral 
worth, with which to subvert their subjectification as disposable subjects of neoliberal 
global economy. Eschewing an understanding of their suffering as the result of fate,107 
rights’ mechanisms of attribution contribute to on-going processes of subjectification of 
themselves as subjects of rights to legal remedy and compensation, a safe environment 
and health. Rights-claiming practices of equal moral worth facilitate, moreover, ethical 
and political resubjectivization, which works to counter the practices of a capitalist global 
economy, which assigns people value because of ‘their lack of access to rights’.108 As 
against neoliberal global constitutionalism, the Bhopal survivors and activists contest the 
privileging of multinational investor rights over both human rights and the positive rights 
of citizenship.109 Their specific demands and aspirations for a non-legalistic -- political, 
social, economic and health – conception of rights and justice are reinforced by the truth 
discourses of rights and the ‘letter of the law’.110 Far from essential, timeless and abstract 
principles, human rights offer paths of action that aid in ‘constructing and reconstructing 
different social and political visions, … in agonistic combat…with other rights and 
indeed with other political idioms and visions’.111  
 
The conducting of Bhopal’s residents as disposable involved a series of structural 
reforms, policy objectives and concrete decisions by multinational corporation and state. 
Various legal, techno-scientific, business ethics and political analysis discussions have 
notably documented the pursuit of cost-cutting-led regulatory arbitrage by Union 
Carbide, 112 made possible by the neoliberalizing state’s desire for technology transfer 
                                                        
106 In the sense given by Sally Engle Merry, Human Rights and Gender Violence: Translating International Law into 
Local Justice (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005). 
107 Veena Das, Critical Events: An Anthropological Perspective on Contemporary India (Delhi: Oxford University 
Press, 1996), pp. 138–139. 
108 Alicia R. Schmidt Camacho, ‘Ciudadana X: Gender Violence and the Denationalization of Women’s 
Rights in Ciudad Juarez, Mexico’, CR: The New Centennial Review, Vol. 5, no. 1 (2005), p. 258. 
109 Upendra Baxi, ‘Geographies of Injustice: Human Rights at the Altar of Convenience’, in Craig Scott 
(ed.), Torture as Tort: Comparative Perspectives on the Development of Transnational Human Rights Litigation (Oxford: 
Hart Publishing, 2001), pp. 197–212. See also, Stephen Gill and A. Claire Cutler (eds), New Constitutionalism 
and World Order (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014). 
110 Selmeczi, op. cit., note 7. 
111 Golder, op. cit., note 9, p. 290. 
112 Shrivastava, Bhopal, op. cit.; Kim Fortun, Advocacy after Bhopal: Environmentalism, Disaster, New Global Orders 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001); Jones, op. cit.; Mark Boden, ‘Neoliberalism and Counter-
Hegemony in the Global South: Reimagining the State’, in Sara C. Motta and Alf Gunvald Nilsen (eds), 
Social Movements in the Global South: Dispossession, Development and Resistance (Basingstoke; New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2011), pp. 83–103. 
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and lack of enforcement of lax legislation and procedures for ultra-hazardous 
production.113  
 
Mobilizing human rights to contest their material constitution as disposable by acting 
upon themselves, Bhopali survivors illuminate how counter-conduct emerges, not at ‘the 
regulated and legitimate forms of power in their central locations’ but, ‘at [power’s] 
extremities, in its ultimate destinations, with those points where it becomes capillary, that 
is, in its more regional and local forms and institutions’.114 Counter-conduct, therefore, 
expands our analytical gaze beyond ‘the legitimate use of monarchic, public, or individual 
powers’,115 calling doubly for the study of those  
point[s] where power surmounts the rules of right which organise and delimit it and 
extends itself beyond them, invests itself in institutions, becomes embodied in 
techniques, and equips itself with instruments…116  
 
What I call Foucault’s ‘capillary orientation’ enables a freeing of relations of power ‘from 
the institution’, in favour of analyzing them ‘from the point of view of technologies’,117 
in which self-transfiguration plays a crucial role. Prevalent materialist and liberal accounts 
grasp human rights either as products of historical material struggles between citizens 
and states or as liberal values constraining the reach and expansion of sovereign 
power.118 A capillary view of rights, however, additionally reveals how they enable 
subjects to redirect, transform and occasionally subvert historically contingent 
mechanisms of conduct that seek to constitute them as disposable subjects; rights enable 
them to ‘act on themselves’ at the levels of individual self-perception and subject 
                                                        
113 Space does not permit a full exposition of such investigations in the present article, see, Bhopal 
Survivors Movement Study Group and Eurig Scandrett, ‘Editor’s Preface and Acknowledgements’, in 
Bhopal Survivors Speak: Emergent Voices from a People’s Movement (Edinburgh: Word Power Books, 2009), p. 2; 
R. Clayton Trotter, Susan G. Day, and Amy E. Love, ‘Bhopal, India and Union Carbide: The Second 
Tragedy’, Journal of Business Ethics, Vol. 8, no. 6 (1989), pp. 439–54. 
114 Foucault, ‘Two Lectures’, op cit., note 25, pp. 96 and 94, emphasis added in second quote. 
115 Cadman, op. cit., p. 540; See the discussions in Patton, op. cit.; Ivison, op. cit.; Roger Mourad, ‘After 
Foucault A New Form of Right’, Philosophy & Social Criticism, Vol. 29, no. 4 (2003), pp. 451–81. 
116 Foucault, ‘Two Lectures’, op cit., note 25, p. 94; emphasis added. 
117 Foucault, Security, Territory, Population, op. cit., note 18, p. 118. 
118 See, for example, Charles Tilly, ‘Where Do Rights Come From?’, in Lars Mjøset (ed.), Contributions to the 
Comparative Study of Development (Oslo: Institute for Social Research, 1992), pp. 9–37; Micheline Ishay, The 
History of Human Rights: From Ancient Times to the Globalization Era (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California 
Press, 2008). 
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formation.119 
Conducting is never complete or irreversible, however. The gaps, fragilities, inadequacies 
or even unintended consequences of conduct 120  make possible the emergence of 
counter-conduct, which in turn expands these very same gaps and fragilities. In Bhopal 
struggles, as the example below highlights, such gaps in conduct facilitate inventive self-
formation that leads to the counter-conduct of subjects agitating to co-govern against 
their other-constructed disposability. The Bhopal Act of 1985, which came into law a few 
months after the disaster, designated the Union of India as the legal and formal 
representative of those who perished in the gas leak and of gas-affected survivors, and as 
such provides the socio-legal context.  
 
To respond to the challenge of representing the thousands of victims and survivors, the 
Bhopal Act adapted the doctrine of parens patriae, ‘parent of the fatherland’, a principle 
invokes the power of the state to act as guardian to those who are deemed unable to care 
for themselves, most commonly children, the elderly, and the disabled or mentally and 
otherwise legally incompetent persons.121 The Union of India deemed this legal tactic a 
practical necessity that would allow it to pursue UCC, and gain reparations, in the US 
Courts, given that the corporation would otherwise have been outside of its jurisdiction. 
As Bridget Hanna notes in her ethnography of Bhopal, there was additionally broad 
acknowledgement that this was morally necessary, as survivors and relatives of casualties 
lacked the ‘resources or even the language (in this case, English) necessary to fight the 
legal battle for themselves’.122 Moreover, the Act intended to shield the Bhopal survivors 
from US litigators who arrived in Bhopal after the gas leak, signing up new ‘clients’ and 
promising huge sums in tort compensation in the US Courts.123 
 
Well-meaning legal advisors did not foresee at the time that this amounted to a 
declaration of Bhopal survivors as legally incompetent; nor that, in the years to come, the 
government’s ‘rhetorical monopolization of the poverty and acute suffering of the 
                                                        
119 See a longer discussion in Odysseos, ‘The Question Concerning Human Rights’, op. cit., note 10. 
120 Kendall R. Phillips, ‘Spaces of Invention: Dissension, Freedom, and Thought in Foucault’, Philosophy and 
Rhetoric, Vol. 35, no. 4 (2002), pp. 331–332. 
121 Baxi, op. cit., note 26, p. 36. 
122 Hanna, op. cit., p. 495. 
123 Tim Edwards, Sathyu Sarangi, and Indra Sinha (eds), The Bhopal Marathon: A Cry for Bhopal (Brighton: 
The Bhopal Medical Appeal, 2012), p. 16. 
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survivors became a way to rob them of their rights by declaring them non sui juris 
(without the legal capacity to act for themselves)’.124 Without the ability to seek redress 
for inadequate representation and with no prescribed means of communicating with the 
state, the Bhopal survivors were produced as voiceless subjects in the legal domain 
privileged in the quest for legal accountability and compensation. As Sheela Thakur 
explains ‘we felt like beggars on the street. We forgot we were asking for our rights as 
citizen’s [sic] of a free country’. 125 
 
Yet, in this incitement of Bhopalis as ‘juridically incompetent’ and voiceless subjects, 
gaps of conduct were seized and counter-conducts developed that disrupted the 
survivors’ prescribed paths of legal silence and (non)action. In 2002 a number of women 
activists launched a new campaign [andolan] to commemorate the 18th anniversary of the 
gas leak: ‘Hit Dow with a Broom’ [Jhadoo Maro Dow Ko!]. A group of gas-affected women 
marched 800 kilometres to New Delhi brandishing their contaminated brooms [jhadoos], 
usually used to sweep their homes and yards in the shadow of the abandoned chemical 
plant site. Handing these to government officials, they were articulating anew the 
consciousness amongst activists and survivors -- who had set up the Bhopal People’s 
Clinic in Spring 1985 to administer sodium thiosulphate (the antidote for cyanide 
poisoning) to their own community -- that ‘the fight for medical care is a fight for our 
rights’.126 These jhadoo ‘actions’ were also taken abroad, partly with the aid of ‘next of 
kin’, to Italy, Belgium, The Netherlands, and the US, where the jhadoos were handed to 
Dow Chemical [owner of UCC since 1999] executives, and continued intermittently for 
several years.127  
 
The symbolic slogan ‘we demand clean up for Bhopal (since the government will not)’ of 
legally voiceless subjects rang quite loud and clear. Seizing competence where it was 
erased by the doctrine of parens patriae the women needed few words. They challenged 
their subjectification as voiceless and worked on their own conduction to render their 
voicelessness insignificant to their condemnation of the state and the corporation. 
Receiving the jhadoos rendered state officials and business executives speechless (most likely 
                                                        
124 Hanna, op. cit., p. 498. 
125 Sheela Thakur, gas survivor cited in Mukherjee, op. cit., note 99, p. 81. 
126 See the Clinic’s ‘manifesto’, Edwards, Sarangi, and Sinha, op. cit., p. 27. 
127  Survivors and activists, Rashida Bee and Champa Devi Shukla won the Goldman Environmental Prize in 
2004 for their campaign. 
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because they were confronted with contaminated items one should touch only with 
gloves, as well as due to the disastrous public relations implications that the symbolic 
action meant for Dow). The campaign enabled the women to attribute responsibility to 
Union Carbide directly for the disaster, instantiating them as spokespeople advancing the 
cause for direct attribution for human rights violations to business. The jhadoo activists 
‘vowed that Dow would be made to accept Union Carbide’s Bhopal liabilities and clean 
up the contamination, or be swept out of India’,128 recovering their voice outside of the 
legal space in which they were deprived it. Invoking their enduring battle for freedom, 
they reworked their own selves with the battle cry:  
 
‘Not flowers but flames are we 
Take the broom to Dow! 
To a new battle for a new freedom 
Take the broom to Dow! 
Hit from this side, hit from that 
Take the broom to Dow!’129 
 
Through their ‘etho-poetic’ symbolic practice, they demanded clean up and 
accountability, co-governing in this way by reasserting their calls for justice and 
articulating their own conducting objectives and aspirations.  
 
Claiming the rights to health, a safe environment, remedy and political representation in 
one symbolic action, the jhadoo maro Dow ko campaign enabled distinct and powerful self-
transfigurations. Reclaiming voice and tonality (not ‘meekly’ and ‘with wit’ continues the 
jhadoo chant) in demanding their rights, survivors marked the struggle as a new ‘site of 
veridiction’130 on justice and accountability and constituted themselves, not as victims 
but as competent social critics of systemic injustices, as analysts of state policy and as 
judges of capitalist development. In their sweeping they articulated both a verdict on the 
legality of limiting their access to their human rights and also a demand to ‘define for 
themselves what is good for them’,131 in short, to co-govern. The Bhopali women with 
                                                        
128 ‘A Jhadoo Action from Last December’, Bhopal.net, 9 March 2005, 
http://news.bhopal.net/2005/03/09/a-jhadoo-action-from-last-december/ (Accessed 3 December 2015). 
129 See the full chant, Edwards, Sarangi, and Sinha, op. cit., p. 108. 
130 Foucault, The Birth of Biopolitics, op. cit., note 24, p. 30. 
131 Foucault, ‘Power, Moral Values and the Intellectual’, op cit., note 39, p. 12. 
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their brooms spoke, and spoke without words, as ethical subjects of rights, whose legal 
silencing created other possibilities for contesting their incitement as disposable and 
expectedly docile subjects. They transformed the gaps created by the adaptation of parens 
patriae into a space ‘within which the possibility of new actions (or utterances or selves) 
can be imagined’.132 These possibilities were not refusals of conduct as such, but refusals 
of being conducted as disposable, rendered visible in the very exercise of 
problematization and co-governing. 
 
Counter-conduct and Foucault’s methodological orientations 
 
The article began with the concern that governmentality critiques of rights unwittingly 
occluded the agency of governed subjects in struggle. Seeking to restore our openness to 
the indeterminacy of human rights and the creative agency of subjects in struggle, it 
explored the possibilities for resistance within the very same view of rights as a 
subjectivizing and governing technology. It examined what opportunities for self-
formation human rights afford, which exceed, subvert or redirect their conducting role. 
As the Bhopali women’s jhadoo campaign makes visible, self-formation is pivotal to the 
thinking of counter-conduct, just as counter-conduct is expressive of Foucault’s ethos of 
‘refusal, curiosity, innovation’. 133  Moreover, Foucault’s insights on counter-conduct 
inflect in important ways his own methodological precautions to the study of power, as I 
argue with respect to each orientation below.  
 
First, investigations of counter-conduct reinforce conducting power’s often-neglected 
reversibility and fragility, which allows us to write the agency of the governed back in to 
our accounts. The thinking of counter-conduct shows the ‘direct and immediate 
relationship’ with what Foucault calls ‘[power’s] object, its target, its field of 
application...where it installs itself and produces its real effects’,134  to be open to 
redirection, evasion and failure. Counter-conduct enables us to pay more thorough 
attention into how rights call forth modes of subjectification that counter processes of 
conduct, whilst remaining a significant governing technology in global politics, which 
                                                        
132 Phillips, op. cit., pp. 331–332. 
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rhetorically, epistemically, performatively and structurally constitutes particular 
governable political and moral subjectivities.135 The ‘theorizing practice’ of counter-
conduct examines how individuals and groups mobilize rights discourses and rights-
claiming practices to infuse and rework their subjectification with alternative forces, 
energies, visions, aspirations and desires.  
 
Specifically in the Bhopal case, analyzing counter-conductive agency makes visible how 
human rights interrupt technologies of conduct that promote, shape, and entrench 
disposability; how they lead to the development of other capacities, aspirations and 
desires that influence survivors’ and activists’ paths of struggle. As the women’s 
campaign shows, human rights contribute to ‘the “folding” back of exterior relations of 
power and governance to create an “interiority” that can act of itself’,136 and on itself, as a 
co-governing subject, whose judgement and inventive counter-conduct disregards and 
contravenes a legally-constructed and state-endorsed voicelessness. 
 
Second, the Jhadoo Maro Dow Ko! campaign shows both moments of conduct and 
counter-conduct and highlights the circular relationship between the two: it reveals how 
‘individuals circulate between [power’s] threads; they are always in the position of 
simultaneously undergoing and exercising this power’.137 While not denying Foucault’s 
methodological insistence to grasp subjects as ‘the vehicles of power’, the focus on 
counter-conduct resists an a priori theorization of subjects as power’s ‘inert or consenting 
target’.138 Power does not crush a preformed individual, whose constitution through 
‘certain gestures, certain discourses, certain desires’139 is inseparable from the potentiality 
of the same subject to inventively unwork that very subjectivity. The jhadoo campaign 
speaks to Bhopali women’s mobilization of symbolic and non-legal ways to ‘fight for 
rights’, ‘wrest[ing] them from the government because we are not begging, we are taking 
what is rightfully ours’.140 It worked to ‘redistribute, reverse, nullify and partially or 
                                                        
135 For example, with regards to human rights, see Odysseos, ‘Human Rights, Liberal Ontogenesis and 
Freedom’, op. cit., note 5, pp. 754–766; Bal Sokhi-Bulley, ‘Government(ality) by Experts: Human Rights as 
Governance’, Law and Critique, Vol. 22, no. 3 (2011), pp. 251–71. 
136 Dean, ‘“A Social Structure of Many Souls”’, op. cit., note 21, p. 156. 
137 Foucault, ‘Two Lectures’, op cit., note 25, p. 98, brackets added. 
138 Ibid. 
139 Ibid. 
140 These are the words of Hazra, a survivor and activist in the women’s struggle, in Edwards, Sarangi, and 
Sinha, op cit., p. 133. 
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totally discredit’ the assignment of disposability. 141  The wielding of contaminated 
brooms by Bhopali women in struggle allows us to see more clearly how counter-
conduct, like conducting power, ‘enter[s] into play at the most basic levels’ of life, such 
that power’s ‘own techniques and tactics’ come to be ‘colonised, utilised, involuted, 
transformed, displaced, extended etc.’142 The counter-conductive potential revealed at 
the ‘most basic levels’ speaks of the routine, self-forming, labour of human rights in their 
everyday problematization of our self-understandings, where they manifest in everyday 
‘rituals’143 and practices of ‘getting free of oneself’ as constructed, an aspect of rights 
often missed in the focus on the symbolic politics of condemnation and state castigation.  
 
Finally, the campaign also illuminates how conduct and counter-conduct both necessitate 
the development of techniques for the production and collation of knowledge. Foucault 
rightly refers to knowledges in the plural, as the plurality and diversity of knowledge 
facilitates an ‘insurrection of knowledges’, that is, contestation generated by those not 
regarded as authoritative agents.144 Bhopali survivors deprived of human rights have had 
to develop their own processes of observation, data collection and collation, and analysis. 
Their struggle is in large part ‘diagnostic’ in the medical and social senses of the word, 
‘problematizing who we are in terms of power, knowledge, and subjectivity’.145 As 
activist Alok Pratap Singh explains, scientific knowledge played a crucial role in the 
organization and self-definition of activists since the early years of the disaster: ‘the 
principal slogan of the Front [Morcha] was evolved: “struggle for people’s rights, people 
science, people’s Unity”’. 146  Similarly, and despite later tensions, 147  Greenpeace 
International’s research into the health and environmental impacts of the Bhopal disaster 
also supported local lived experiences by authoritatively bringing knowledge to bear 
‘against the institutions and against the effects of knowledge and power that invests 
scientific discourse’.148 Moreover, as seen in the International Medical Commission on 
                                                        
141 Foucault, Security, Territory, Population, op. cit., note 18, p. 204. 
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Bhopal’s investigation into the suppression of crucial chemical information and 
survivors’ medical histories, such insurrections of knowledge reinforce demands for 
appropriate and effective treatment of the impact of gas and subsequent contamination 
exposure.149 
 
Insurrections of knowledge have been crucial to the Bhopal struggle. Under the human 
right to health, moreover, new types of relation to one’s community and to oneself as 
insistent co-governors of one’s own health can be engendered. As Satinath Sarangi, a 
leading activist of the International Campaign for Justice in Bhopal and founder of the 
Bambhavna Trust, argues, ‘in many ways the survivors are the experts in their conditions. 
Not only is it vital to use therapies which can be controlled by the recipient, it is also 
important to gather the people’s knowledge for the purposes of research.’ 150 UCC’s 
refusal to disclose the exact composition of gases released in the explosion, or to advise 
on their effects and appropriate treatments, as well as the Indian Medical Council’s 
failure to effectively research and recommend an appropriate treatment protocol for the 
gas-affected population after 20 years of research, led to new forms of local knowledge 
production: ‘[a]t Sambhavna we have pioneered the use of “verbal autopsies”, so that the 
bereaved are given the dignity of an assessment of cause of death when their loved ones 
die without reliable medical contact’.151 Moreover, in the long years since the leak, 
survivors had to commission their own ‘proper, peer-reviewed research on the ongoing 
effects of the gas’.152  
 
In the contaminated brooms action, too, insurrectional knowledges show conduct to be 
contestable, contributing to the creation of ‘disjuncture[s] between the field of 
conduction and the relationship the individual has to herself or himself as conducted 
subject’ in which ‘counter-conducts develop’.153  In part, the campaign of handing 
contaminated brooms to state officials and Dow Chemical executives was made possible 
                                                        
149 See the statement of the International Medical Commission on Bhopal, Edwards, Sarangi, and Sinha, op 
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by the counter-conductive search for alternative knowledges that revealed the effects and 
extent of gas exposure, as well as worsening soil and water contamination, produced by 
local activist groups and by NGOs such as Greenpeace and Amnesty.154 
Conclusion 
 
Acknowledging human rights as a conducting technology entailing diverse processes of 
legal, political and ethical subjectification of rights-bearers, the article discussed the 
tendency to ignore the destabilisations of conduct, which struggles through rights can 
bring about.155 The article investigated Foucault’s thinking of ‘counter-conduct’ as a 
particularly pertinent and productive aspect of his polysemic thinking on 
governmentality. It argued that the thinking of counter-conduct can be brought to bear 
on our understanding of human rights and helps us grasp them more fully as essential to 
both our conduct and our ability to redirect and displace mechanisms and processes of 
conducting power in our on-going constitution of ourselves.  
 
Looking at the possibilities afforded for counter-conduct by the mobilization of human 
rights in the context of the 1984 Bhopal gas disaster revealed the processes and 
mechanisms of governing Bhopalis as disposable to be unstable, variable, and reversible. 
It showed human rights to enable modes of self-formation that reconstitute survivors as 
co-governors, contributing to conduct’s reorientation, subversion or evasion. At the 
same time, the discussion of Bhopal survivors’ self-formation through struggle offers a 
more substantial conception of rights grounded in social, health and environmental 
justice.156 At the same time, counter-conduct is ‘never completely autonomous…’:157 it 
does not aim to produce new universals or stabilized counter-subjectivities, nor does it 
deny conducting power’s resilience and adaptability.158 
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Finally, the thinking of counter-conduct called for a recalibration of Foucault’s broader 
methodological orientations regarding the study of power from the perspective of 
counter-conduct. Such a reworking of methodological commitments contests univocal 
perspectives human rights and governing, eschewing both a view of rights-holders as 
over-determined by conducting power and also a view that ignores their conduct through 
human rights. 
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